


**District of Columbia
Court of Appeals**



No. 23-BG-1072

In re **SONYA N. ARMFIELD**,
A Suspended Member of the Bar of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals

BDN: 23-BD-043
DDN: 2016-D230

Bar Registration No. 491717

BEFORE: Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, and McLeese and Deahl, Associate
Judges.

O R D E R

Bar Counsel charged respondent Sonya N. Armfield with intentional or reckless misappropriation, commingling, and serious interference with the administration of justice in Board Docket No. 22-BD-076. Armfield indicated that she would raise disability-related mitigation under *In re Kersey*, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C. 1987), prompting the Board on Professional Responsibility to impose conditions on her continued practice of law to protect the public. *See* Bd. Pro. Resp. R. 7.6(c). After holding an evidentiary hearing, the Ad Hoc Hearing Committee in this case determined that Armfield violated several of these conditions and recommended that Armfield be suspended per D.C. Bar R. XI, § 13(c). In its Report and Recommendation, the Board adopted the Hearing Committee’s findings and also requested that we suspend her pending the conclusion of her underlying disciplinary proceeding.

Armfield filed exceptions to the Board’s report, after which this court issued (1) a briefing order, and then (2) an order to show cause why Armfield should not be temporarily suspended pending our final action in the underlying disciplinary proceedings. After considering her response to the order to show cause—but before any briefing had been submitted—we temporarily suspended Armfield on March 21, 2024, but permitted briefing to proceed. We later clarified, in response to Armfield’s motion for clarification, that Armfield had been suspended “temporarily . . . pending a determination by this court, after full briefing (and now oral argument), as to whether Ms. Armfield should be suspended by this court during the entire pendency

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of the underlying disciplinary proceeding.” Two days before the scheduled oral argument, Armfield filed a motion to postpone the argument for “a minimum of 120 days.” We denied the request and ordered that the matter be resolved on the record and briefs alone, without argument.

On consideration of the Board’s report, Armfield’s exceptions, and the parties’ briefing, we determine that there is substantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that Armfield violated several conditions imposed on her practice of law so that she should be suspended from the practice of law during the entirety of the underlying disciplinary proceeding. For example, Armfield was required to submit monthly medical reports to the Office of Disciplinary Council and Office of the Executive Attorney, but the record shows that she stopped sending these reports in June 2023. And as of November 2023, neither ODC nor OEA could obtain these reports themselves because Armfield rescinded her consent for the release of her medical records (in violation of another condition that she waive such confidentiality). In addition, Armfield was required to schedule a complete audit of her law practice “as soon as practicable” after December 2022, but there was clear testimony before the Hearing Committee that since then, Armfield failed to respond to necessary records requests and otherwise failed to effectively communicate with ODC so that a full audit never occurred.

Armfield’s argument that the Hearing Committee violated her due process rights fails. She was aware of the charged violations two months before the Hearing Committee’s evidentiary hearing and had multiple opportunities to file briefs and exceptions, so that she had “adequate notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” *In re Fay*, 111 A.3d 1025, 1031 (D.C. 2015). And she has not identified any “substantial prejudice” that resulted from any purported lack of due process. *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Armfield also argues that the Hearing Committee erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard (as opposed to clear and convincing evidence) to determine whether she violated practice conditions. But her suspension does not hinge on this question—the Board concluded that Armfield violated conditions under either standard, and we find that there was substantial evidence to support that conclusion. It is thus

ORDERED that Armfield is hereby suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia pending final disposition in her underlying disciplinary proceeding in Board Docket No. 22-BD-076. *See* D.C. Bar R. XI, § 13(c).

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FURTHER ORDERED that Armfield's attention is drawn to the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 relating to suspended attorneys.

PER CURIAM

Copies e-served to:

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