

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS  
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
AD HOC HEARING COMMITTEE



Aug 11 2025 3:34pm

A Member of the Bar of the  
District of Columbia Court of Appeals  
(Bar Registration No. 1003053)

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Disciplinary Docket No. 2022-D213

\* Consult the ‘Disciplinary Decisions’ tab on the Board on Professional Responsibility’s website ([www.dcattonarydiscipline.org](http://www.dcattonarydiscipline.org)) to view any subsequent decisions in this case.

Counsel. The Hearing Committee also has fully considered the written statement submitted by the complainant, the Chair's in camera review of Disciplinary Counsel's files and records, and the Chair's ex parte communications with Disciplinary Counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the Hearing Committee finds that the negotiated discipline of a thirty-day suspension, fully stayed in favor of one year of unsupervised probation with conditions, is justified and recommends that it be imposed by the Court.

II. FINDINGS PURSUANT TO D.C. BAR R. XI, § 12.1(c)  
AND BOARD RULE 17.5

The Hearing Committee, after full and careful consideration, finds that:

1. The Petition and Affidavit are full, complete, and in proper order.

2. Respondent is aware that there is currently pending against him a Disciplinary Counsel investigation into allegations of misconduct. Tr. 22-23;<sup>1</sup> Aff. ¶ 2.

3. The allegations that were brought to the attention of Disciplinary Counsel are that Respondent knowingly disobeyed a rule of a tribunal in the course of a proceeding in violation of Virginia Rule 3.4(d), knowingly failed to respond reasonably to a lawful demand for information regarding this matter from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in violation of District of Columbia Rule 8.1(b), engaged in conduct that seriously interfered with the administration of justice in violation of

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<sup>1</sup> "Tr." refers to the transcript of the limited hearing held on June 30, 2025. "Pet." refers to the Petition, and "Aff." refers to the Affidavit.

District of Columbia Rule 8.4(d), and failed to comply with an order of the Board in violation of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3). Pet. at 10-11.

4. Respondent has freely and voluntarily acknowledged that the material facts and misconduct reflected in the Petition are true. Tr. 23-24, 30; Aff. ¶¶ 4, 6. Specifically, Respondent acknowledges that

1. Respondent is a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, having been admitted on September 9, 2011, and assigned Bar number 1003053. He is also licensed in Virginia; however, he is in an inactive status.

2. Respondent and Leslie E. Crane were married in October 2002. On May 11, 2015, Ms. Crane filed for divorce from Respondent in Fairfax County Circuit Court. At the time, Ms. Crane was, and still is, disabled and unable to work while Respondent worked as an attorney earning between \$120,000-\$165,000 per year. Respondent was represented by Anita McFadden during the divorce proceedings.

3. On February 24, 2016, the parties entered into a Property Settlement and Support Agreement (“PSSA”). The PSSA required Respondent to pay spousal support, certain insurance premiums, and unreimbursed medical expenses for Ms. Crane.

4. On April 25, 2016, a final order of divorce was entered in Fairfax County Circuit Court. The PSSA was incorporated into the final order [of] divorce. Pursuant to the final order of divorce, the parties were required to give each other and the court at least thirty days’ advance written notice of any change of address or telephone number. Respondent’s address for purposes of service and notice in the final order of divorce was 2207 Dike Road, Woodland, WA 98674.

5. Ms. McFadden withdrew as counsel for Respondent upon entry of the final order of divorce.

6. On July 13, 2017, Respondent sent Ms. Crane an email from crane\_tj@yahoo.com, with the subject: Change of Address. In the email, Respondent wrote, “My new address is: Saudi Aramco PO Box

8523, Dhahran 31311, Saudi Arabia.” Respondent did not provide a residential address and did not file a change of address with the court until October 28, 2019. When he did file the change of address with the court, he provided the same PO Box that he provided Ms. Crane in July 2017.

7. On October 9, 2018, Ms. Crane, through counsel, filed a Verified Petition for Issuance of a Rule to Show Cause. In the Petition, Ms. Crane alleged, *inter alia*, that Respondent was in violation of the parties’ Final Order of Divorce and requested that the court issue a Rule to Show Cause against Respondent and find him in contempt of court for violating the final order of divorce. She also requested that the court order Respondent to pay all amounts owed to her.

8. On October 17, 2018, the court issued a Rule to Show Cause, requiring Respondent to appear before the court on November 16, 2018, to show cause why he failed to obey the final order of divorce and should not be held in contempt of court.

9. On November 16, 2018, the court held a hearing on the Rule to Show Cause; however, Ms. Crane had not been able to serve Respondent, and he did not appear. The court issued an Amended Rule to Show Cause, setting a new hearing date of January 30, 2019, to give Ms. Crane additional time to effectuate service upon Respondent.

10. Ms. Crane, through counsel, made several attempts to serve Respondent with the Rule to Show Cause and Amended Rule to Show Cause. Counsel sent the documents to Respondent’s P.O. Box in Saudi Arabia, but the package was returned undelivered. The documents were also emailed to Respondent’s email address: crane\_tj@yahoo.com. Finally, Ms. Crane served Respondent’s mother-in-law at Respondent’s last known residential address in Woodland, WA.

11. On January 30, 2019, the court held a hearing on the Amended Rule to Show Cause. Respondent did not appear. The court found that Ms. Crane’s service on Respondent’s mother-in-law in Woodland, WA, was valid and Respondent had sufficient notice of the hearing. The court ruled that it would find Respondent in contempt for failure to pay the amounts owed under the final order of divorce but did not immediately enter the order because Ms. Crane intended to

supplement the record regarding the exact amounts Respondent owed related to various obligations.

12. On July 23, 2019, Ms. McFadden entered a special appearance on behalf of Respondent and filed a motion to quash service of process and dismiss Ms. Crane's Amended Rule to Show Cause, Verified Petition for Issuance of Rule to Show Cause, and Motion to Modify Spousal Support for lack of service of process. Respondent's motion was denied on September 20, 2019.

13. On March 13, 2020, the court held Respondent in contempt. The court found that Respondent had willfully and knowingly violated the final order of divorce and entered a judgment against Respondent in favor of Ms. Crane in the amount of \$192,999.32. The court set purge terms, which required Respondent to pay the judgement within 180 days of the order.

14. On April 10, 2020, Respondent, through Ms. McFadden, filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals of Virginia. Respondent argued that he was not properly served with the motion to show cause and, therefore, the contempt order was void. He also argued that he should not have been found in contempt because he did not willfully violate the divorce decree due to his alleged inability to pay. Respondent also argued that the amount of the sanction and attorney's fees awarded Ms. Crane were excessive.

15. On February 2, 2021, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that Respondent was properly served with the motion to show cause, that the evidence was sufficient to find him in willful contempt of court, and that the lower court did not err in imposing sanctions or awarding Ms. Crane attorney's fees based on Respondent's failure to abide by the divorce order and appear in the lower court proceedings.

16. Ms. McFadden withdrew as counsel for Respondent on July 22, 2021.

***Respondent's Failure to Respond to Disciplinary Counsel's Investigation***

17. On October 28, 2022, Ms. Crane filed a disciplinary complaint against Respondent, alleging that his failure to abide by the court orders and being found in contempt of court violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Ms. Crane alleged that Respondent had not made any payments or attempts to cure his contempt since July 22, 2021.

18. On December 15, 2022, Disciplinary Counsel sent a letter of inquiry with a copy of the complaint to Respondent's email address of record with the D.C. Bar, crane\_tj@yahoo.com, and asked him to provide a written response by January 4, 2023. Disciplinary Counsel did not receive a rejection notice from Yahoo.com after the email was sent.

19. On December 27, 2022, Disciplinary Counsel also mailed the inquiry letter with a copy of the complaint to Respondent's two addresses of record with the DC Bar: P.O. Box 861 Woodland, Washington 98674-0900 and P.O. Box 8523 Saudi Aramco, Dhahran 31311, Saudi Arabia. On January 19, 2023, the United States Postal Service returned Disciplinary Counsel's letter and the complaint sent to Respondent's Woodland, Washington P.O. Box address. The letter sent to the P.O. Box in Saudi Arabia was not returned.

20. Respondent did not provide a response to Disciplinary Counsel's letter of inquiry by January 4, 2023, and he did not ask for an extension of time to provide the requested response.

21. On February 7, 2023, Disciplinary Counsel sent another letter to Respondent, again by email to crane\_tj@yahoo.com, informing him that his failure to respond in writing to the allegations in the complaint could result in further disciplinary actions under Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) and requested that he respond by February 21, 2023. The email was not returned undelivered, and Respondent did not respond to an email inquiry.

22. On February 8, 2023, Disciplinary Counsel also mailed the February 7<sup>th</sup> letter, which included a copy of the complaint, to Respondent at another address he used - 7630 Provincial Drive,

Apartment 109, McLean, Virginia 22102. The letter and enclosures were sent by first-class and certified mail. Disciplinary Counsel also sent the February 7<sup>th</sup> letter with enclosures to Respondent's P.O. Box address in Saudi Arabia by air mail.

23. On February 21, 2023, the letter that was sent to Respondent's McLean, Virginia address by certified mail was returned unsigned. On February 23, 2023, the USPS returned the letter that was sent to Respondent's McLean, Virginia address by first class mail. The letter sent to Respondent's P.O. Box in Saudi Arabia was not returned.

24. Respondent did not provide any response to Disciplinary Counsel's letter of inquiry by February 21, 2023, either by email or regular mail, and he did not ask for an extension of time to provide the requested response.

25. On March 8, 2023, Disciplinary Counsel filed with the Board on Professional Responsibility, pursuant to Board Rule 2.10, a motion to compel Respondent's written response to the investigation. Disciplinary Counsel served its motion on Respondent by email, which was not returned, and by first-class email [sic] to the Woodland, WA P.O. Box, the Saudia [sic] Arabia P.O. Box, and the Mclean, VA address. Only the letter sent to Respondent's address in McLean, VA was returned.

26. Respondent did not file an opposition or otherwise respond to Disciplinary Counsel's motion.

27. On May 8, 2023, the Board issued an Order compelling Respondent to submit a written response to Disciplinary Counsel's investigation within ten days. Pursuant to Board Rule 2.10(a), the Office of the Executive Attorney sent a copy of the Board's Order to Respondent to his email address on record with the DC Bar, crane\_tj@yahoo.com, as well as his mailing address: P.O. Box 861, Woodland, WA 98647. Neither was returned. Respondent did not respond pursuant to the Board Order.

28. On June 29, 2023, Respondent renewed his registration with the D.C. Bar. He continued to list his addresses as crane\_tj@yahoo.com, P.O. Box 861, Woodland, WA 98647, and a secondary address of P.O. Box 8523, Saudi Aramco, 31311 Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

29. On January 17, 2024, Disciplinary Counsel filed a Specification of Charges against Respondent. Disciplinary Counsel attempted to serve Respondent via email, U.S. Postal Service, and FedEx, but Respondent never acknowledged receipt of any correspondence sent by Disciplinary Counsel. On March 26, 2024, Disciplinary Counsel filed a motion with the D.C. Court of Appeals for service by alternative means. The motion was granted on May 7, 2024, and Disciplinary Counsel served Respondent via his email address on the same day.

30. On August 22, 2024, the Hearing Committee Chair issued an Order directing Respondent and Disciplinary Counsel to confer on potential hearing dates. Disciplinary Counsel asked Respondent for his availability via email, but he did not respond. Disciplinary Counsel filed a statement regarding hearing dates on August 30, 2024 and the Hearing Committee Chair issued an Order on September 9, 2024 setting the hearing for December 3 and 12, 2024. The Order was sent to Respondent's crane\_tj@yahoo.com email address.

31. On September 10, 2024, Respondent responded to Disciplinary Counsel's email about proposed hearing dates. In his email, Respondent explained that his mail service in Saudi Arabia is unreliable, and he never received any of the packages sent by Disciplinary Counsel. He also stated that while crane\_tj@yahoo.com is an active email address, it is no longer his primary email address, and he does not check it regularly. He explained that Disciplinary Counsel's emails ended up in the spam folder and were automatically deleted after 30 days. Respondent took full responsibility for the issues related to both his mail service and email, and he acknowledged that it is his responsibility to ensure the D.C. Bar and Disciplinary Counsel can contact him.



32. Respondent's stipulated conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct:

- a. Virginia Rule 3.4(d), in that he knowingly disobeyed a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding;
- b. District of Columbia Rule 8.1(b), in that he knowingly failed to respond reasonably to a lawful demand for information regarding this matter from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel;
- c. District of Columbia Rule 8.4(d), in that he engaged in conduct that seriously interfered with the administration of justice; and
- d. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3), in that he failed to comply with an order of the Board.

Pet. at 2-11.

5. Respondent is agreeing to the disposition because Respondent believes that he cannot successfully defend against discipline based on the stipulated misconduct. Aff. ¶ 5; *see* Tr. 24-26, 30-31.

6. Disciplinary Counsel has made no promises to Respondent other than what is contained in the Petition. Aff. ¶ 7. Those promises are to recommend a thirty-day suspension, fully stayed in favor of one year of probation with conditions as part of this negotiated discipline. Pet. at 11. Respondent confirmed during the limited hearing that there have been no other promises or inducements other than those set forth in the Petition. Tr. 30.

7. Respondent has conferred with his counsel. Tr. 15; *see also* Aff. ¶ 1.

8. Respondent has freely and voluntarily acknowledged the facts and misconduct reflected in the Petition and agreed to the sanction set forth therein. Tr. 24-27, 30; Aff. ¶¶ 4, 6.

9. Respondent is not being subjected to coercion or duress. Tr. 30-31; Aff. ¶ 6.

10. Respondent is competent and was not under the influence of any substance or medication that would affect his ability to make informed decisions at the limited hearing. Tr. 16-17.

11. Respondent is fully aware of the implications of the disposition being entered into, including, but not limited to, the following:

- a) he has the right to represent himself or retain counsel at a hearing;
- b) he will waive his right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to compel witnesses to appear on his behalf;
- c) he will waive his right to have Disciplinary Counsel prove each and every charge by clear and convincing evidence;
- d) he will waive his right to file exceptions to reports and recommendations filed with the Board and with the Court;
- e) the negotiated disposition, if approved, may affect his present and future ability to practice law;
- f) the negotiated disposition, if approved, may affect his bar memberships in other jurisdictions; and
- g) any sworn statement by Respondent in his Affidavit or any statements made by Respondent during the proceeding may be used to impeach his testimony if there is a subsequent hearing on the merits.

Tr. 18-22; Aff. ¶¶ 9-12.

12. Respondent and Disciplinary Counsel have agreed that the sanction in this matter should be a thirty (30) day suspension, fully stayed on the condition that Respondent be placed on probation for one year. Pet. at 11; Tr. 26-27. Respondent understands that as conditions of this negotiated disposition and period of probation, he will be required to:

a) update his contact information with D.C. Bar Member Services to include a current email address that he checks regularly and a phone number at which he can be reliably reached (these updates shall be made within thirty days of the negotiated discipline being accepted by the Court, if not earlier, and Respondent will provide proof of the updates to Disciplinary Counsel), and

b) comply with the terms of the Spousal Support Modification Order issued by the Circuit Court for the County of Fairfax on July 22, 2021, and during the probationary period, proof of compliance will be sent to Disciplinary Counsel no later than the fifth day of each month.

*See* Pet. at 11-12; Tr. 27-29. Respondent additionally understands that if he fails to comply with the terms of his probation, his probation may be revoked and he may be required to serve the thirty-day suspension previously stayed, consecutively with any other discipline or suspension that may be imposed in the event of a finding that he engaged in further unethical conduct. Pet. at 12; Tr. 28-29.

13. Disciplinary Counsel has provided a statement demonstrating the following circumstances in mitigation, which the Hearing Committee has taken into consideration:

The sanction takes into account several mitigating factors. First, Respondent has taken responsibility for his failure to respond to Disciplinary Counsel and comply with the Board order. In an email to Disciplinary Counsel, Respondent acknowledged that it was his responsibility to check the email address he had on file with the D.C. Bar and his failure to do so was entirely his fault. Second, as of August 31, 2024, Respondent has satisfied the purge terms of the contempt order, including repayment of Ms. Crane's portion of the parties' 2015 tax refund. Finally, Respondent has no prior discipline.

Pet. at 14. During the limited hearing, the parties stipulated to these facts in mitigation. Tr. 32-33.

14. The complainant presented a written comment. The complainant provided the following information, which the Hearing Committee has taken into consideration. The complainant claims that Clyde C. Koons, IV,<sup>2</sup> formerly known as Clyde C. Crane, IV, has a “lengthy history of contumacious behavior that had an extremely negative impact on [complainant’s] health.” Complainant’s Submission at 1 (June 30, 2025). The complainant stated that in the process of pursuing a negotiated discipline, Respondent had paid “the accrued arrearages” and is current in his spousal support payments as of June 24, 2025. *Id.* The complainant expressed

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<sup>2</sup> The Petition notes that Respondent is also known as Clyde “T.J.” Koons. Complainant does not explain why she refers to Respondent as Clyde C. Koons, IV. She refers to Respondent as Mr. Koons or Mr. Crane throughout her statement.

concern that Respondent would stop making the payments once the negotiated probation period ended. *Id.* at 2.

### III. DISCUSSION

The Hearing Committee shall recommend approval of a petition for negotiated discipline if it finds:

- (1) The attorney has knowingly and voluntarily acknowledged the facts and misconduct reflected in the petition and agreed to the sanction set forth therein;
- (2) The facts set forth in the petition or as shown at the hearing support the admission of misconduct and the agreed upon sanction; and
- (3) The sanction agreed upon is justified.

D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(c)(1)-(3); *see also* Board Rule 17.5(a)(i)-(iii).

A. Respondent Has Knowingly and Voluntarily Acknowledged the Facts and Misconduct and Agreed to the Stipulated Sanction.

The Hearing Committee finds that Respondent has knowingly and voluntarily acknowledged the facts and misconduct reflected in the Petition and agreed to the sanction therein. Respondent, after being placed under oath, admitted the stipulated facts and charges set forth in the Petition, and denied that he is under duress or has been coerced into entering into this disposition. *See supra* Paragraphs 4, 8-9. Respondent understands the implications and consequences of entering into this negotiated discipline. *See supra* Paragraph 11.

Respondent has acknowledged that any and all promises that have been made to him by Disciplinary Counsel as part of this negotiated discipline are set forth in

writing in the Petition and that there are no other promises or inducements that have been made to him. *See supra* Paragraph 6.

B. The Stipulated Facts Support the Admissions of Misconduct and the Agreed-Upon Sanction.

The Hearing Committee has carefully reviewed the facts set forth in the Petition and established during the hearing and concludes that they support the admission of misconduct and the agreed-upon sanction. Moreover, Respondent is agreeing to this negotiated discipline because he believes that he could not successfully defend against the misconduct described in the Petition. *See supra* Paragraph 5.

With regard to the second factor, the Petition states that Respondent violated Virginia Rule 3.4(d) (knowingly disobeying a ruling of a tribunal); D.C. Rule 8.1(b) (knowingly failing to respond reasonably to a lawful demand for information from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel); D.C. Rule 8.4(d) (serious interference with the administration of justice); and D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3) (failing to comply with an order of the Board).

The evidence supports Respondent's admission that he violated Virginia Rule 3.4(d). The stipulated facts provide that the Fairfax County Circuit Court (Virginia court) found that Respondent willfully and knowingly violated the final order of divorce and the court held him in contempt for failure to pay amounts owed under the final order of divorce. Pet. at 4-5 (Stipulated Facts ("Stip. Fact") 11, 13). The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed that decision, finding that the evidence was sufficient to find Respondent in willful contempt of court. Pet. at 5-6 (Stip. Fact 15).

The evidence also supports Respondent's admission that he violated D.C. Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(d). The stipulated facts provide that Disciplinary Counsel repeatedly emailed Respondent at his email address of record with the D.C. Bar and asked him to provide a written response to its inquiry letter, but Respondent did not provide any response and none of the emailed messages received a rejection notice. *See* Pet. at 6-7 (Stip. Facts 18, 21). Respondent also did not respond to the mailing of letters to two addresses of record with the D.C. Bar, and the letters mailed to the P.O. Box in Saudi Arabia were not returned. Pet. at 6-8 (Stip. Facts 19, 22-23). Respondent did not ever provide a response to the letter of inquiry, either by email or regular mail, and did not ask for an extension of time to provide a response. Pet. at 7-8 (Stip. Facts 20, 24). Here, the same conduct that supports the violation of D.C. Rule 8.1(b) also is evidence showing that Respondent violated D.C. Rule 8.4(d). *See* D.C. Rule 8.4, cmt. [2] (failure to respond to Disciplinary Counsel's inquiries is a violation of Rule 8.4(d)).

Finally, the stipulated facts support Respondent's admission that he failed to comply with the May 8, 2023, Board Order in violation of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 2(b)(3). *See* Pet. at 8-9 (Stip. Facts 25-27). That same conduct also constitutes a violation of D.C. Rule 8.4(d). *See, e.g., In re Daniels*, 299 A.3d 541, 542 (D.C. 2023) (per curiam); *In re Taylor*, Bar Docket No. 504-98, at 5-8 (BPR Apr. 26, 2001) (issuing a Board reprimand and compiling cases).

C. The Agreed-Upon Sanction Is Justified.

The third factor the Hearing Committee must consider is whether the sanction agreed upon is justified. *See* D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(c); Board Rule 17.5(a)(iii) (explaining that hearing committees should consider “the record as a whole, including the nature of the misconduct, any charges or investigations that Disciplinary Counsel has agreed not to pursue, the strengths or weaknesses of Disciplinary Counsel’s evidence, any circumstances in aggravation and mitigation (including respondent’s cooperation with Disciplinary Counsel and acceptance of responsibility), and relevant precedent”); *In re Johnson*, 984 A.2d 176, 181 (D.C. 2009) (per curiam) (providing that a negotiated sanction may not be “unduly lenient”). Based on the record as a whole, including the stipulated circumstances in mitigation, the Hearing Committee Chair’s in camera review of Disciplinary Counsel’s investigative file and ex parte discussion with Disciplinary Counsel, and the Hearing Committee’s review of relevant precedent, the Hearing Committee concludes that the agreed-upon sanction is justified and not unduly lenient, for the following reasons:

The conduct that led to the disciplinary charges in this matter arose from Respondent’s failure to comply with obligations arising from his divorce proceedings in Virginia and his failure to respond to efforts made by Disciplinary Counsel and the Board of Professional Responsibility to secure his participation in the ensuing investigation. There are no misconduct claims arising from Respondent’s representation of legal clients. Respondent is now in compliance with



his legal obligations relating to the Virginia divorce. Tr. 32-33. While Respondent's failure to respond with respect to the disciplinary proceedings took place over a nearly two-year span, he took full responsibility for his actions in a communication with Disciplinary Counsel on September 10, 2024. Pet. at 10 (Stip. Fact 31); Tr. 32. When given the opportunity to address the Hearing Committee at the beginning of the limited hearing on June 30, Respondent repeated his full acceptance of responsibility and expressed remorse for his actions. See Tr. 11. Respondent does not have a prior discipline record. Pet. at 14; Tr. 33. Disciplinary Counsel has stipulated to the fact that there are no aggravating factors. Tr. 33-34. These factors support the conclusion that the agreed-upon sanction is justified and not unduly lenient.

In this jurisdiction, misconduct involving a knowing failure to respond to Disciplinary Counsel's inquiry and a Board Order, and a serious interference with the administration of justice, generate a range of sanction from a Board reprimand to thirty-day suspensions. See, e.g., *In re Lea*, 969 A.2d 881 (D.C. 2009) (thirty-day suspension with reinstatement conditioned on proof of fitness); *In re Cooper*, 936 A.2d 832 (D.C. 2007) (per curiam) (thirty-day suspension with reinstatement conditioned on proof of fitness); *In re Burnett*, 878 A.2d 1291 (D.C. 2005) (per curiam) (thirty-day suspension with reinstatement conditioned on proof of fitness); *In re Nielsen*, 768 A.2d 41 (D.C. 2001) (per curiam) (public censure); *Taylor*, Bar Docket No. 504-98, at 9-11 (Board reprimand). Similarly, sanctions in cases involving violations of D.C. Rule 3.4(c) (the equivalent to Virginia Rule 3.4(d))

range from a moderate suspension with probationary terms to an informal admonition. *See, e.g., In re Untalan*, 174 A.3d 259 (D.C. 2017) (per curiam) (six-month suspension with all but sixty days stayed in favor of one year of probation with conditions where attorney ignored multiple court orders to file a brief in each of seven separate criminal or juvenile appeals in which he had been appointed as counsel); *In re Blackwell*, 299 A.3d 561 (D.C. 2023) (six-month suspension with all but sixty days stayed in favor of three years of probation with conditions where attorney failed to pay court-ordered child support and made knowingly false statements to Disciplinary Counsel); *In re Wemhoff*, 142 A.3d 573 (D.C. 2016) (per curiam) (thirty-day suspension fully stayed in favor of one year probation with conditions where attorney revealed client confidences, disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, and seriously interfered with the administration of justice); *In re Richardson*, Bar Docket No. 2003-D259 (Letter of Informal Admonition Sept. 7, 2004) (informal admonition for failure to pay child support).

In light of the factors of this case, a thirty-day suspension fully stayed in favor of a one-year term of probation is not unduly lenient and is justified as within the range of sanctions imposed in comparable cases.

#### IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, it is the recommendation of this Hearing Committee that the negotiated discipline be approved and that the Court impose the agreed-upon sanction of a thirty-day suspension, fully stayed, in favor of one year of unsupervised probation with the conditions that he:

(1) update his contact information with D.C. Bar Member Services to include a current email address that he checks regularly and a phone number at which he can be reliably reached (these updates shall be made within thirty days of the negotiated discipline being accepted by the Court, if not earlier, and Respondent will provide proof of the updates to Disciplinary Counsel), and

(2) comply with the terms of the Spousal Support Modification Order issued by the Circuit Court for the County of Fairfax on July 22, 2021, and during the probationary period, proof of compliance will be sent to Disciplinary Counsel no later than the fifth day of each month.

If Respondent fails to comply with the terms of his probation, his probation may be revoked and he may be required to serve the thirty-day suspension previously stayed, consecutively with any other discipline or suspension that may be imposed in the event of a finding that he engaged in further unethical conduct.

AD HOC HEARING COMMITTEE



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Kathleen Wach  
Chair



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Ms. Carolyn Haynesworth-Murrell  
Public Member



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Francine Weiss  
Attorney Member